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The family is the basic unit of social organization in any society, and in Chinese culture the 
centrality of family organization has been explicitly acknowledged for centuries. Efforts to change 
society must deal with the family a s  an institution, and since the process of mate choice is a 
central defining element of family organization, changes in the nature of the mate choice process 
will be an  important aspect of such change efforts. In this paper I wish to consider how the 
nature of the mate choice process has changed over time in urban China. I am concerned here 
with both long term and short term changes. In the long term I want to examine how much the 
process of mate choice has changed in general since 1949 in the PRC. From a short term 
perspective I am interested in how much this process has  been changed in the post-Mao or reform 
period. 
In  discussing changes in the process of mate choice in urban China I will rely primarily on 
data from a survey of mate choice and marriage relations in Chengdu on which I have been 
collaborating over the last several years. My collaborators in this research are Yuan Yayu and 
Xu Xiaohe, from the Sociology Research Office of Sichuan University, although they bear no 
responsibility for the particular interpretations offered here. The Chengdu survey was conceived 
as a partial replication of a survey on mate choice and marriage relations I directed in the Detroit 
metropolitan area in 1984, and so in some places I will compare results from the Chengdu survey 
with figures drawn from the Detroit study, in order to compare and contrast mate choice in urban 
America and urban China.' The survey data from Chengdu were collected from a representative 
1. Of course, neither city is "typicnl" of all urbnn nrens in either society. and in ternis of population ronking, industrial structure and 
other criteria the two cities are not the ideal conipnrisons. I believe that the brood lines of the findings from these cities nre not 
otypicol of other urban areas in these two societies, but in the absence of comparoble doto from such arens (not ovnilable in either 
soctety). 1 cannot address the issue of typicoltty d~rectly. 
sample of 586 ever-married women between the ages of 20 and 70 in the two main urban districts 
of Chengdu in May of 1987, and the response rate was 87.7921.~ The interviews were conducted 
by sociology students from Sichuan University via face-to-face interviews, usually in the homes of 
the respondents, but in some cases in the workplace or some other location. The Chengdu 
respondents had first married over a range in years from 1933 to 1987, and so it is possible to 
make both longer term and shorter term comparisons of the nature of the mate choice process 
with these data. 
T h e  Background on  Changing Chinese  Mate Choice 
The process of mate choice has been an arena of contention for Chinese reformers and 
revolutionaries for much of the twentieth century. The main features of the "traditional" system 
of mate choice in China are fairly familiar. Most marriages were arranged, and in many cases 
what  was involved was a fairly extreme form that  could be termed "blind marriage," in which the 
bride and groom did not even meet until the day of the wedding. Not only was consent of the 
principals not required, but ages and relative ages could be suited to family concerns rather than 
individual preferences, resulting in such phenomena as "adopted little daughters-in-law," child 
betrothals, and large age disparities between spouses in either direction. Partly in order to insure 
parental control over the mate choice process, there was substantial effort to control the social 
interactions of young people and particularly of daughters, with' the preservation of female 
virginity being of particular concern. There was no direct governmental regulation of the act of 
marriage, in terms of licenses, registration, or laws effectively restricting ages at marriage, and 
the wedding feast (usually held by the groom's family) and associated ritual activities were what 
determined that the couple was considered married. Marriage finance negotiations were usually 
part  of the mate choice process, and these commonly involved both a bride price and a dowry 
component, with the importance of these components varying by class, region, and other factors. 
2. The Detroit snmple was only slightly different. in all o representative sample of 459 ever-morried women between the ages of 18 
and 75 were interviewed in the tri-county n~etropolitnn nreo (Woyne, Ooklond. and Macomb counties), and the response rate was 
74%. 
But commonly the bride's family made demands on the groom's family for various gifts in cash 
and kind to be delivered to them, and they in turn expended some of these and perhaps some of 
their own resources in equipping the bride with a dowry which was transported with her into her 
marriage. As the preceding phrase indicates, most often the new bride went to live with her 
groom's family after the wedding. 
These "traditional" marriage customs were already under attack from the early decades of 
the twentieth century, and they were beginning to change g r a d ~ a l l y . ~  The most spirited attacks 
of the May Fourth reformers focused on the system of arranged marriage, but other elements, 
such as  lavish wedding feasts, patrilocal post-marital residence, and even the stress on female 
virginity, received some criticism a s  well. To some extent industrialization and increasing wage 
labor fostered changed mate choice customs, but probably the main impetus for change was 
Westernization. Through increasing exposure to Western ideals of freedom of mate choice, 
romantic love, and neolocal postmarital residence, some portion of the Chinese populace came to 
see changed marriage customs as a requirement of modernity. Still, even on the eve of the 
Communist victory in 1949, changes in the direction of such Western-style mate choice customs 
were mainly confined to a portion of the well-educated urban elite, and had not had that  much 
impact on less educated urbanites or rural  resident^.^ 
The story of changes in Chinese family life after 1949 is also fairly familiar and will not be 
reviewed here in detail.5 For the purposes of the analysis that  will be presented here, I wish to 
consider the underlying mechanisms that  may have fostered changes in marriage customs in 
different periods, and what impacts they might be expected to have. 1 will argue that  there are 
three distinctive change mechanisms that  have been operating, separately or in combination, in 
3. No detniled discussion of these earlier changes will be offered here, given the ample writings on this topic by others. The best 
known works in English nre Olgn Lnng. Chinese Fanlily and Societv. New Haven: Ynle University Press, 1946; and Marion Levy. 
The Funlily Revolution in Modern Chinn. Cnnlbridge: tinrvnrd ~ n i v e k i t y  Press, 1949. 
4. A good general overview of changes in the Chinese foniily, both before 1949 and through the 1950s. is presented in Willinni Goode, 
World Revolution and Fn~nily Pntterns. New York: The Free Press. 1963, Chapter 6. 
5. Among other works, there ore detniled trentments in the two works the  current  writer co-nuthored with Willinm Pnrish, Village 
and Fnniily in Conte~iipornry China nnd Urban Life in Contempornry China (both University of Chicago Press. 1978 nnd 1984, 
respectively). 
various periods since 1949: governmental direct change efforts, social structural changes, and 
cultural influences produced by Western impact. 
The most familiar change mechanism is direct governmental change  effort^.^ What is 
involved is direct efforts by the partylstate in the PRC to use laws, regulations, propaganda, 
campaigns and other mechanisms to get people to alter their marriage customs. The authorities 
perceive tha t  they are  trying to induce the population to refrain from following old "feudal" or 
"bourgeois" marriage customs and to begin following "socialist" practices instead. The desired 
socialist marriage practices would include freedom of mate choice, marriage only in adulthood 
(and, increasingly, "late" marriage), the absence of marriage finance demands, mate selection 
based upon compatibility and political/moral criteria rather than such factors as  wealth or 
attractiveness, and simple and frugal wedding celebrations without elaborate feasts or traditional 
ritual a ~ t i v i t i e s . ~  Some traditional marriage customs, however, were not on the "must change" 
list. For example, virginity was stressed by the new order if anything more than the old, although 
now perhaps it was intended to imply to males as  well a s  females. And patrilocal post-marital 
residence was never the object of concerted c r i t i c i ~ m . ~  
If direct family change efforts have been the major force for changes in marriage customs, 
what pattern of change over time might we expect to find? Although there have been some 
alterations in the specifics of family policy in the PRC over time, particularly the changing 
stipulations on minimum marriage ages,g the most important changes have involved not policies, 
6. Indeed, mnny works on funlily chnnge in the PRC largely restrict their attention to such direct chnnge efforts. See, for exomple. C. 
K. Yang. The Chinese Family in the Con~niunist Revolution. Combridge: MIT Press. 1959; ond M. J. Meijer, Marriage Law nnd 
Policy in the Chinese People's Republic, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. 1971. 
7. In some periods there were nttempts to replace ritual practices such as the couple bowing to ancestral tablets and the new bride 
serving ten to andlor wnshing the feet of her mother-in-low, which conveyed filiolity and familinl subordination, with new ritual 
elements, such as bowing to n portrait of Man and pledging loyalty to the CCP, which express subordination instead to the new 
political system. 
8. Occasionally orticles have appeared in the press pointing to the advantages of tnotrilocal post-morital residence, and these become 
more common in the 1970s when it wns increasingly recognized that the patrilocal custon~ posed ohstocles to the regime's family 
plnnning goals. And the 1980 revised n~orriage law does. unlike the origin01 1950 marrioge low. state thot the couple can live after 
marriage with either the bride's fomily or the groom's family. (See article 8 of the 1980 low. trnnsloted in Pacific Affairs. Vol. 
57:266(1984). Interestingly. the new low makes no mention of the possibility of the couple living neolocnlly, even though we will 
see that this is the most conlmon option in urban Chengdu and. no doubt. in other cities.) Still, in none of the major direct chnnge 
efforts aimed a t  the family since 1949 has post-marital residence been on important focus. 
9. The 1950 marriage low stated minimun~ marrioge ages of 18 for females and 20 for moles. By the 1970s administrative pressure 
wns being used to foster late marriage, ond in urban orens this often meant efforts to enforce a minin~utn marriage age of 25 for 
but priorities. As in other realms, there have been "high tides" of family change efforts-- 
particularly in 1950-53, 1958-60, and in the Cultural Revolution decade (1966-76). The latter 
period can be regarded as a time of the most pervasive and sustained hostility to "non-socialist" 
marriage customs. Since Mao's death and in the period of the post-Mao reforms, in contrast, 
there has been a considerable relaxation of official efforts to foster family change. If directed 
change efforts are the primary mechanism of altering marriage customs, then, we might expect to 
find movement away from "socialist" mate choice and weddings in the reform era. Whether this 
movement would take the form of revivals of traditional marriage customs or increased salience of 
Western "bourgeois" practices would depend upon other factors. 
The second major mechanism I wish to consider is social structural changes. As has been 
argued in detail in my earlier work with William Parish on rural and urban social trends, the 
underlying argument behind this mechanism is that  people tend to respond not to government 
policies and propaganda, but to the changing social structure in which they live. If that  social 
structure changes, whether through economic development, direct governmental change efforts, or 
other forces, then people will adapt their behavior to the new structure around them. 
The most extensive discussion of how industrialization, urbanization, and other forms of 
modernization of social structure foster changes in marriage customs is provided by William 
Goode.Io At the center of his argument is the idea tha t  modernization fosters a change from 
families a s  production units to families as  consumption units, with a rise of wage labor outside of 
the home. In so doing family transmission of occupational skills and of property becomes less 
important in achieving adulthood, and competition via schooling and in an  increasingly non-family 
based job market become more and more important. As a result, young people are less dependent 
upon familial resources for achieving adulthood and have more opportunities to meet and get to 
know potential mates, and families have less motivation to try to maintain strict control over such 
- 
feniales and 27-8 for males. The 1980 revised tiiarrioge law set  new legal minimu111 ~iiarriage ages a t  20 for females and 22 for 
males. and by so  doing to sonie extent undertilined the effort to foster late marriage by administrative measures. 
10. See World Revolution and Family Patterns. op. cit. 
matters as  mate choice and post-marital residence. So modernization can be expected to produce a 
number of changes in marriage customs. But other structural changes in society besides those 
associated with gradual economic development can be expected to influence family practices as  
well. In particular, it can be argued that  inducing socialist transformation in many ways 
accelerates changes that  would occur over decades as  a result of economic development, because 
through socialist transformation the elimination of family property transmission and the thrusting 
of young people into non-familial wage labor force competition occur all a t  once. 
While the detailed consequences for marriage customs under this mechanism can only be 
inferred by a systematic analysis of the structural elements of the changed social order, in general 
it may be suggested that  the effect of modernization-related structural changes and of socialist 
direct governmental change efforts on marriage customs will in many ways coincide, but in some 
instances will differ. In particular, both mechanisms can be expected to foster increasing freedom 
of mate choice, rising ages a t  marriage, and a declining importance of marriage finance 
negotiations." However, one would expect increasing neolocal post-marital residence to occur as a 
result of modernization although this is not stressed in official direct change efforts, and one would 
not expect modernization to foster wedding simplification or the maintenance of a norm of 
premarital chastity. 
If the structural changes in Chinese society are  the main impetus for alterations in 
marriage customs, the pattern of actual changes over time should be different from that  described 
for governmental direct change efforts. We should expect to find a major difference between 
marriages that  occurred before 1949 or even before 1955 and those that  began afterward. 
However, we would not expect to find further clear changes induced by the Great Leap Forward 
or the Cultural Revolution, since these did not, for all of their sound and fury, produce major 
11. In an earlier article I compared the predictions drown from Goode's theory of modernization-induced family change and fanlily 
policy in the PRC. See "The Faniily" in hl. Oksenberg, 4 . .  China's Developnientnl Experience, New York: Prneger, 1973. In 
general Coode's theory is one of "convergence," with family forms in socialist and capitalist societies heconling more and more 
s in~i lnr as  they become modernized econoniicnlly. It should be noted, however. that chnnges in social structure produced by 
socialist transforn~ation lnny in some cases work contrary to the goveinment's direct fa~iiily chnnge efforts, as  in the shift to more 
of a pure bride price systeni of marriage finance in rural Cunngdong after collectivization. 
changes in the way urban society was structured.12 What we should expect to find for the reform 
e ra  is less clear. On the one hand you have fairly rapid economic development, higher levels of 
schooling, and rising living standards in urban areas, which might be expected to produce further 
incremental movement toward more "modern" marriage customs, although the basic structures of 
urban life have not yet changed very much. On the other hand the reforms have entailed a 
modest amount of reduced bureaucratic control over all urban resources and on a small scale the 
same rise of family-run enterprises that  is occurring on a much more widespread basis in the 
countryside. Insofar a s  there is an  increasing salience of family-controlled resources, we might 
expect to find a revival of some traditional aspects of marriage customs in the reform era, rather 
than a strengthening of "modern" forms. 
Our third and final change mechanism is Westernization. The assumption underlying this 
mechanism is that  as ideas and cultural influences flow into China from the outside world, and 
particularly from the West, those exposed to such influences will be likely to change their family 
behavior in order to copy Western forms. As a consequence, Western customs of mate choice, 
ideas about love, ways of celebrating marriage, and other practices will become defined as  
"advanced" and "modern," and some Chinese will attempt to gain prestige by following imported 
customs and practices. In terms of the expected direction of family change, this mechanism leads 
to the same sort of predictions as  our modernization-related structural change mechanism, since it 
is the results of more advanced modernization in Western countries that  will be copied. But the 
nature of the change process has more in common with our first mechanism, direct governmental 
change efforts, since it is assumed that  exposure to influential ideas and cultural practices can 
induce changes in marriage behavior, even if the social structure in which one lives has  not been 
substantially altered. If we think in terms of Marxist categories, we might say that  both directed 
12. The Great Leap did, for o short time, produce dromntic structural changes in rural society in the early people's communes. 
However, with the collapse of the Leap and the revision of commune organization, what emerged hy 1961-2 was a structural form 
that was in most respects a direct curry-over from the APCs of 1956-8. Urban areas experienced no comparable structural 
transformations nfter the mid-1950s. 
change efforts and Westernization imply an "idealistic" approach to change while social structure- 
induced changes imply a "materialistic" set of assumptions.13 
If Westernization has been the major mechanism of change in marriage customs, the 
pattern of changes over time we would expect to find is fairly clear. Western influence was 
prevalent in urban areas of China prior to 1949 (although more so in major coastal cities than in 
interior cities such as Chengdu). After 194'9, however, factors such as the takeover effort, the 
Korean War, and the American blockade combined to produce a sharp reduction in Western 
influence in China and a major propaganda campaign against the glorification of Western ideas 
and customs.14 From the 1950s into the 1970s Western ideas and influences were kept to a 
minimum in China, but in the post-Mao era this situation has changed dramatically. Sharp 
increases in Westerners in China; Chinese travelling and studying in the West; and access to 
Western movies, television serials, fashions, and other cultural products have produced renewed 
exposure to, and admiration of, Western culture and society. In addition, there is increasing 
awareness in China of the patterns of sociai life in more substantially Westernized Chinese 
environments in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan. This awareness may help make Western 
ways seem less "alien" than in the past, and more suited to Chinese conditions. In any case, the 
products of Western influence are widely visible in urban China today, whether they involve youth 
interest in rock music and disco dancing, a revival of Christianity, television viewing of "Little 
House on the Prairie" and "My Favorite Martian," or China's top leaders wearing Western 
business suits. We might expect, then, to find marriage customs also increasingly subject to 
Western influence in the reform era. 
13. However. the  social structural change mechonisn~ is broader than Marxist ~naterinl is~ii  in assuming that  a vnriety of changes in 
social structure. and not only those involving economic forces and class relations. can cause changes to occur. 
14. Of course, in the 1950s Western influence was partially replaced by Soviet influence, ond I will not get into the debate here about 
how "Western" the Soviet Union is. Still, on balance Western influence in China was dra~natically reduced, and by the 1960s 
even Soviet influence had been substantially curtailed. See the discussion in Beverley Hwper, China Stands Up. London: Allen & 
Unwin. 1986. 
Trends in Marriage Customs in Chengdu, 1933-87 
In the pages that  follow I will utilize information from our urban survey in Chengdu to view 
changes in marriage customs since the years prior to 1949, and to try to see whether the patterns 
I find provide evidence for one or another of the underlying change mechanisms I have just 
discussed. Given the nature of these data and the somewhat overlapping quality of earlier 
predictions from various mechanisms, it cannot be expected that  I will be able to finally conclude 
that  all changes observed fit consistently into the expectations provided by one particular change 
mechanism. Still, i t  may be of considerable interest to see in some detail, and from a high quality 
sample survey, what the actual pattern of changes in marriage customs has been. 
Each of the following tables presents simple two-way tabulations from a large number of 
different measures included in the Chengdu questionnaire. Since the figures follow a common 
format, it is important to explain how they are being presented. The marriage customs of our 
respondents are compared, not in terms of their age or year of birth, but in terms of the year in 
which they first got married.lS And I present here results with respondents divided into five 
"marriage cohorts." The divisions in each case are not based upon standard decade or half-decade 
periods, but correspond roughly to the major political shifts that  are commonly used to periodize 
contemporary Chinese history. The first marriage cohort consists of all of those respondents who 
were first married prior to 1949;16 the second includes those married after 1949 but prior to the 
Great Leap Forward; the third consists of those who married after the onset of the Leap but prior 
to the Cultural Revolution; the fourth is composed of those who married during the Cultural 
Revolution decade; and the final marriage cohort contains all of those women in the sample who 
. - 
first married in the post-Mao era. Where appropriate the tables also include comparable figures 
from the Detroit survey, and in that  case I present only overall figures, ignoring for the most part 
15. Ninety-four percent of the Chengdu respondents had been mnrried only once, so, although we collected some informntion on 
custolns involved in remarriages, only first marriages will be considered here. In contrast, in the Detroit survey 84% of the 
respondents had been morried only once. 
16. Technically. since Chengdu did not fnll under Chinese Communist control until the end of 1949. perhaps I should hnve mode the 
dividing year 1950. However, shifting a single yenr (in this case. 1949) between categories does not substantially olter the results 
reported here. 
changes over time. In the text that  follows I will not attempt to provide an interpretation of every 
nuance of each measure. Instead, I will be primarily concerned with the overall pattern of 
changes over time, and in particular with whether the comparison of the experiences of those who 
first married in the reform era (in column 5) and the rest of the sample fits one or another of the 
change mechanisms discussed above. 
Table 1 about here 
In Table 1 I present results for several different questions aimed a t  assessing the degree to 
which a marriage was arranged by parents or not and also questions about other aspects of the 
mate choice process that  may be considered related to freedom of mate choice. Several 
observations can be made about these results. First, and not surprisingly, it is apparent that a 
major shift away from the traditional pattern of parentally arranged marriage has occurred, with 
the instances in which parents dominate the proceedings declining from 60-70% of the pre-1949 
marriages to under 10% today. Relatedly, those who met their husbands directly rather than 
through an  introduction, those whose introductions came from peers rather than parents, those 
who had some romantic relationship and even dates prior to marriage, and those who describe 
themselves a s  having been in love, have all increased sharply in comparison with the pre-1949 
era.17 
17. I t  must  be ncknowledged, however, that  respondent and other binses may exnggernte the changes. For example, it mny be 
politically acceptnble to say thnt your pnrents arrnnged your marriage if you married before 1949 but not if you nlnrried more 
recently. Even though precautions were tnken to assure respondents tha t  this was an acndemic study, that  their answers would 
he strictly confidential, nnd thnt their pnrticipntion was voluntary, still in the context of recent Chinese history, in which survey 
research is new and unfamiliar and the political risks of unacceptable expression old and fnlnilinr, we cannot he certain how 
frnnkly our respondents answered questions such a s  these. See the general discussion of these and other problems in Stanley 
Rosen nnd David Chu. Survey Resenrch in the People's Republic of Chinn. Washington: United States lnfornlation Agency, 1987. 
Still, since I an1 primarily interested here not in the pre-1949lpost-1949 conipnrison. but in the contrast across periods in the PRC, 
nnd particulnrly between pre-reform and post-reform eras, this  sort of bias should not affect niy conclusions on those later 
periods. This is the case because. even if respondents are overstating somewhat the degree of freed0111 and romance in post-1949 
niarringes, and understnting the degree of pnrentnl control. there is no renson to expect that  respondents who married in one of 
the latter four periods should exnggernte more thnn those in other periods. One other factor thnt nlny produce a n  exaggerated 
impression of chnnge over time in these results is the fact thnt our sample is coniposed of women currently resident in Chengdu. 
but not necessarily resident in thnt city when they ~iiarried. Thus  the enrliest ~nnrriage cohorts have more mernbers who grew up 
outside of Chengdu, and often in rural nrens. where their mnrringe custonis would not be expected to reflect urbnn marringe 
customs a t  thnt time. (The percentage of women who were ninrried in Chengdu is 56C, 50%. 74%. 7%. and 9 1 8  in the five 
nlnrringe cohorts.) Preliminnry exn~iiinntion of conipnrnble tables with only those who married in Chengdu included indicated 
that  only for the second niarriage cohort is the "trnditionnlism" of mnrriage customs somewhat exaggerated by the presence of 
women who married in rural nrens. The results for the first cohort do not chnnge much if I consider only urban ~nnrrioges prior 
to 1949. which indicates thnt  urbnn and rural customs were not a s  different before 1949 us they were to become afterward. 
These results also make i t  clear that  compared with the American situation, there remain 
important restraints on individual choice of a mate even in recent years, a conclusion that  is 
hardly surprising. We did not ask our Detroit respondents whether their marriages had been 
arranged, but from Table 1 it is apparent that more of them met their husbands directly than did 
our Chengdu respondents, and that  even when introductions occurred they were more likely to 
come from age peers. Parental influence is more clearly visible in the Chengdu sample. We can 
also detect evidence in these results that  no real "dating culture" has yet emerged in Chengdu.18 
Although it is not evident from these figures, for most young people still today dating primarily 
takes place after the selection of a potential spouse, rather than prior to that  decision, and even 
then in recent times 30-50% of our respondents say they rarely or never had dates with their 
eventual husbands (see #6). There has been a modest increase in the number of women who say 
they had other romances prior to marriage, but such women still represent less than 30% of all 
respondents, in contrast to the two-thirds of Detroit respondents who had had other boyfriends 
(see #7). And there has been very little increase in the proportion of women who had other men 
they considered marrying before they married their first husbands, with this being the case for 
less than 10% of Chengdu respondents, in contrast to almost half of the Detroit women (see #8). 
In general, then, even though young people have more say  in mate choice than their parents do in 
contemporary Chengdu, they must make a selection of a mate without much prior romantic 
experience, and once they have made a selection it is very difficult to change their minds and try a 
different partner. In this sort of context I was somewhat surprised to see how many respondents 
in recent cohorts said that  they were completely (quanxin) in love with their eventual husband and 
had no doubts prior to the wedding (see #9 and #lo). It would appear that  either the power of 
positive thinking or post-hoc dissonance reduction makes Chinese respondents able to interpret 
18. The defining elements of a dnting culture have been disputed, but central trnits would include the ability of young people to link 
up roninntically without adult supervision in a setting that is not defined a s  leading to rnnrringe. In such a setting a niarketploce 
analogy is accepted, in which it is norlnotively accepted that one can "try out" various romantic partners before finally settling 
on one of then1 for marriage. See the discussion in John hlodell, "Dnting Beconies the Way of American Youth." in L. Moch and C. 
Stark, eds., Essays on the Fanlily and Historical Change, College Stntion: Texas ARLM University Press. 1983. 
their mate selection as more unproblematic than American respondents, even though the latter 
have had more chances to consider alternatives.Ig 
The third major conclusion to emerge from these data, and the one most relevant to the 
present discussion, is that  the pattern of change over time in aspects of freedom of mate choice 
seems to fit what I would expect from the social structural change argument, and not what I 
would expect either from direct governmental change efforts or Westernization as  change 
mechanisms. This conclusion is based upon the fact that  the apparent changes in freedom of mate 
choice seem to have been well established by the end of the 1950s. There are only modest signs of 
changes since then, either in the Cultural Revolution era  or in the reform era  (compare columns 3, 
4, and 5). In only one instance, involving frequency of dating with the eventual husband (#6), do I 
find much evidence of further change in the years after 1958, with more recent brides reporting 
that  they had dated their fianc's often. (Questions #7-10 show some small signs of change after 
the 1950s, but not much further change during the reform era.) So with one minor exception, 
what we see in Table 1 appears to be evidence of initial change followed by substantial stability, 
with a predominantly youth-initiated but still relatively constrained (by American standards a t  
least) mate choice system persisting through various changes in leadership and political lines. In 
the reform era  there are  no clear signs here of either a revival of traditional family controls or of 
further changes induced by Western influence, unless frequency of dating the eventual husband 
can be counted as  the latter. But the major battle for freedom of mate choice seems to have been 
won by the end of the 1950s, a s  a result of the major changes in the structure of urban social life 
that  had occurred, and no comparable shifts have taken place since that  time. 
Could the crudeness of the division into five marriage cohorts obscure important fluctuations 
in the freedom of mate choice over time? In order to investigate this question I constructed a 
19. Of course. it might be argued that it is precisely the existence of alternatives in A~iierica which pro~notes doubts about the final 
choice. The Detroit figures on recollected love feelings are not strictly comparnble to the Chengdu figures because in the DAS 
survey we utilized a seven-point scale, stnrting at "head over heels in love." My collnborntors in Sichuon felt that Chinese 
respondents would have trouble making distinctions along a 7-point scale. so they orgued for the Bpoint scale we eventuolly used. 
summary scale from six of the freedom of choice measures included in Table I then 
computed a three year moving average of the resulting summary freedom of mate choice scale 
scores and graphed this against the year in which respondents got married.21 The result is Figure 
Figure  1 about  here 
Several things are apparent from examining Figure 1. First, the graph confirms my final 
and most-important conclusion above: there has been little change in the overall degree of 
freedom of mate choice within the sample since about 1957. Neither the Great Leap Forward, the 
Cultural Revolution, nor the reform era has produced clear trends toward a further increase (or 
for that  matter a reduction) in the trend away from arranged marriages. However, another trend 
is revealed in the graph that  was obscured when I lumped together all pre-1949 marriages in 
Table 1, as  well a s  all marriages in the years 1949-57. The increase in overall freedom of mate 
choice during the 1950s, during the midst of major social structural changes, is dramatically 
shown. But the graph also reveals that there was a shift in the direction of more freedom of mate 
choice already underway in the pre-World War I1 period, so that  women who married during the 
1940s were enjoying somewhat more freedom in picking a mate than their elder sisters, aunts, 
and mothers had earlier. This finding should not be entirely surprising, since it confirms the 
"family revolution" that  Marion Levy, Olga Lang, and others argued was underway prior to 1949. 
Given my primary interest here in post-1949 social trends, I won't enter into the debate here 
about what the sources of these earlier changes were. Suffice i t  to say that  both social structural 
changes (such as  increases in female education and non-family wage labor) and Western cultural 
20. The items included were #1.2.3.6,7, and 9, all scaled so that  o high value indicated more freedom of choice. Tlie items were 
chosen based upon the strength of their mutual intercorrelations. and the  overage among all six items wos r=.42. The scale was 
computed bosed upon the mean of the stnndnrdized (or Z) scores on each iten1 
21. A three year moving average calculates the mean of one year and the years before and after it-for example, the value for 1957 
would he an overage of the  means computed for 1956. 1957. and 1958. The  reason for using this moving average procedure is to 
smooth out the fluctuations that  would occur from year to year. especially in the  early years represented in the graph, where the 
number of respondents used to compute these averages is fairly small. As a result of this sort of smoothing process, the prin~nry 
trends in the d a b  can be more readily seen. 
influences (transmitted by May Fourth era reformers) were involved, with governmental directed 
change efforts not an important factor. 
Table 2 about  h e r e  
In Table 2 I display a more miscellaneous set  of responses from the Chengdu survey, all of 
which have something to do with the circumstances that  existed a t  the time our respondents first 
married. Items #1 and #2 show patterns similar to what we have seen in Table 1. Both in actual 
patterns of work prior to marriage and in expectations of working after marriage, a dramatic shift 
occurred which had been consolidated by the end of the 1950s, so that  the great majority of 
women worked prior to marriage, and with feu. exceptions they expected to keep working 
throughout their married lives. There is a modest further increase in the percentage of women 
who worked before marriage in recent cohorts, but this increase may be due simply to the fact 
that  the marriage age has continued to climb in the sample (see #11), rather than resulting from 
any alternation in customs and expectations. Other items in the table that  follow a similar 
pattern of change consolidated by the end of the 1950s are #6, which shows a "regularization" of 
marriage, with fewer cases involving husbands who had been married before, and #lo ,  which 
shows an increase in the time couples were acquainted prior to marriage. 
One other item, #7, bears some resemblance to this pattern, but with some differences. In 
this case what we have is a n  indirect effort to examine the extent of premarital sexual experience. 
In one portion of the questionnaire we ask women how old they were when they first had various 
experiences, including their first sexual experience, and from other parts of the questionnaire we 
can determine their age when they first married. Simple subtraction allows me to construct a 
conservative estimate of the proportion of respondents who had sex prior to marriage. 
(Conservative because those who had sex prior to marriage but then married before their next 
birthday would not be distinguished from women who remained virgins until marriage.)22 In this 
22. The figures given may also be a conservntive estimate becnuse some women'may hove lied about when they hod their first sexual 
experience. There wos n disturbing tendency for some respondents to report ages of first sexual experiences that were Iater- 
solnetimes substnntiolly Inter-thnn the oges at which they got ~narried. Although part of this tendency-which was not visible in 
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instance we see an  apparent jump in premarital sexual experience occurring for women who 
married in the early 1950s, and then rough stability, although with premarital sex perhaps 
becoming slightly more likely among recent cohorts.23 
The second and higher estimate of premarital sexual experience shown in the table (in row 
#7a) makes use of other information--on whether the respondent is estimated to have conceived 
her first child prior to marriage (see rows #8a and 8b) or whether she cohabited prior to marriage 
(see row #9). Respondents who according to one or more of these three measures had premarital 
sexual experience are  counted in row #7a. And the figures in that  row show both higher 
estimated levels of premarital sexual experience overall, and a modest further increase in such 
experience in the reform era. Whichever set  of estimates is relied upon, these data provide 
evidence, if such is needed, that  premarital sex remains much less common in urban Chengdu 
than in urban Detroit. In fact, among the youngest cohorts of Detroit women we interviewed the 
percentage of non-virgins a t  marriage as detected by the method used for computing row #7 rises 
to over 80%, whereas even using all information available to me the estimated proportion of 
recently marrying females in Chengdu who were not virgins a t  marriage was only 30%. 
Two other contrasting patterns are visible for other items in Table 2. The items about 
parental approval of the groom (#4 and #5) show general stability over time (although there is 
some decrease in the percentage of parents strongly approving between the first and second 
marriage cohorts). Evidently, whether the parents did the choosing or whether the young people 
themselves took the initiative does not have too much effect on the level of approval that the 
parents give to the match. This pattern could be taken to indicate that  even when young urban 
Chinese make their own choice of a mate they heavily take the preferences of their parents into 
the data fro111 Detroit respondents-niny be nttributable to traditional Chinese age reckoning practices. which yield ages one or two 
years above the actual age. I suspect tha t  overzealous efforts to conceal preniaritai experiences mny nlso play a role. Loss of 
virginity prior to marriage is still n nintter of considerable shnnie and personal risk in China. As noted earlier, though, any bias 
of this type should be roughly constant across ninrringe cohorts. This means thnt I should be nble to see trends in such data. 
even if the precise levels are underestimntes. 
23. Of course, in most instances preniaritnl sex probnbly occurred with the  eventual husband. and so these percentnges represent 
something considerably less than "free love." Also, the fact thnt mnrringe wns occurring later and Inter, a s  shown in #11, needs 
to he taken into account in interpreting this trend. 
consideration. However, even in Detroit, with a much higher level of youth autonomy in dating 
and mate choice, the levels of parental disapproval are only modestly higher (see column 6). My 
measure of premarital births and conceptions (#S) also shows only a slight change across time 
 period^.^" 
The figures for ages a t  marriage shown in #11 and #12, in contrast, show a pattern of 
linear increase, with average marriage ages continuing to climb (and more steeply for women than 
for men) across all cohorts. However, I suspected that, a s  with freedom of mate choice, the crude 
time categories used in Table 2 might obscure important trends. For that  reason I computed the 
average female age a t  marriage for each year of marriage, and then I graphed the three year 
moving average of female marriage ages that I had calculated. The results are shown in Figure 
2. 
Figure 2 about  here 
Several interesting features are visible from this graph. First, a s  in Figure 1, changes were 
already underway prior to 1949. Roughly speaking, the average female age a t  marriage had 
already increased from about 17  to around 19 prior to 1949.25 Second, throughout most of the 
years since 1949, a dominant tendency toward gradually increasing ages at marriage is visible. 
This pattern does not fit what we expect from the directed change mechanism, since forceful 
advocacy of late marriage did not begin until a t  least the 1960s, if not the 1970s. Nor does 
Western influence provide a "fit" with this long term trend. The structural changes associated 
with the takeover and socialist transformation in the 1950s also do not fit, unlike what we saw in 
24. The timing of first birth measure again is an indirect one, based upon colnparing dates of marriage and dates of first birth, and of 
course this technique is  suhject to some errors. Even if this method of estinlation were very accurate, it would still yield o 
conservative picture of the extent of. and trends in, prelnarital sex. This is the case not only because women who are sexually 
active prior to mnrriage mny not become pregnant, but also because even if they do they lnay be able to arrange to get an 
abortion. One study in a Tianjin hospital reported that  the percentage of abortions there involving unmarried wonien rose fro111 
9 8  in 1977 to 168 in 1979. See Knthrine Lyle, "Plnnned Birth in Tinnjin." The China Quarterly. no. 83. 1980. p. 560. And a press 
report claimed tha t  in 1986 27.9% of all of the abortions performed in Peking involved unmarried women. (See Emily Honig and 
Gail Hershatter. Personal Voices. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988, p. 114.) If more and more premaritnl pregnancies are 
ending in abortions, then figures based upon the dote of birth of the first child will not reveal the  full measure of any trend 
toward increases in premaritnl conceptions. 
25. The even lower figures shown for the years prior to 1935 are something of a fluke produced by a snlall number of unusually 
young marriages in the sample ond are not a realistic estimate of general marriage ages a t  tha t  time. 
the case of freedom of mate choice earlier. However, i t  seems likely that  other, more gradually 
evolving structural changes hold the clue to this dominant trend. To be specific, increasing 
schooling for women, growing employment and income earning opportunities (see row #I),  and a 
,tightening housing supply situation provided sources of gradual change that  might explain the 
pattern visible in Figure 2. 
In addition to this primary trend toward later ages at marriage, Figure 1 also reveals 
several interesting reversals. There are  temporary "peaks" in female marriage age in 1959, 
1966, and 1879, and these are followed by reductions in the following years. These secondary 
trends are  more readily intepretable in terms of the directed change mechanism than the other 
explanations. The first "relapse" occurred in the wake of the Great Leap Forward and its ensuing 
famine, when concern about feeding the population superceded any efforts to'enforce family 
change goals. The second instance corresponds to the latter stages of the Cultural Revolution, a 
time during which political chaos made concerted governmental pressure for late marriage 
impossible. The third reduction in average female marriage ages is the most striking. According 
to these figures, the average female marriage age has declined by about three years (from about 
26 to roughly 23) in the years since 1979. As noted earlier, it was a t  the s tar t  of this period that 
the new marriage law, with its de facto reduction of minimum marriage ages, was promulgated. 
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that  the 1980 law, by reducing directed change efforts to enforce 
even later marriage ages, was a primary contributor to this striking drop.26 However, other 
factors may have contributed a s  well. The policy of sending massive numbers of urban youth to 
the countryside may have contributed to the pre-1979 increase by leading many to postpone 
marriage until they could return to the cities, when they had to initiate the mate selection process 
relatively late. The discontinuation of this program a t  the end of the 1970s eliminated one 
important source of delays in marriage. In addition, perhaps the modest increases in dating and 
26. Even though the 1950 ~norrioge law had proclainied 18 as  the mininlu~n marriage age for females, since the early 1970s urban 
authorities had been trying to enforce a much higher n~inimuni, usunlly around 25. Thus the effect of the 1980 law was to 
provide some legal grounds for females n~arrying as  young as 20. It should he noted that data from a national fertility survey 
reveal trends in urban ~narrioge nges that are very siniilnr to those shown in Figure 2--both in terms of the primary trend and in 
regard to the secondary dips in mnrringe nges. See Judith Bnnister. China's Changing Population. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1987, pp. 156-7. 
premarital intimacy discussed earlier have helped to encourage somewhat earlier marriage, a s  has 
rising p r ~ s p e r i t y . ~ ~  In any case, the primary trend visible for marriage age to increase seems 
readily interpretable in terms of the sorts of structural factors focused on by theorists of the 
modernization process, while the secondary trend toward reduced ages in some periods can be 
explained through a combination of directed change efforts and structural change influences. 
Only a few other items in Table 2 yield signs of a changing pattern of mate choice in the 
reform era,  and those signs are  rather slight. In addition to the rise- in the proportion of brides 
already at work shown in #1, there is another aspect of the "I-egularization" of family life shown 
in the increased percentage of brides whose parents were still together when they married (in #3). 
In the Chinese context the primary causes of family disruption are death and family separation, 
rather than divorce, which is the primary cause in the Detroit sample. Impressive increases in 
life expectancy in the PRC make i t  increasingly likely in recent years that  women will be able to 
marry from "intact families." 
, 
In #9 there is also some evidence of a rise in premarital cohabitation, a trend for which I 
have no full e ~ p l a n a t i o n . ~ ~  Increases in premarital cohabitation have begun to be reported in the 
Chinese press as well, but the circumstances are not fully described. Harsh enforcement of late 
marriage is said to be one factor leading couples to cohabit prior to the wedding, but with a 
relaxation of such pressure the urge to live together prior to marriage should be reduced. Some 
accounts suggest that  anxieties about the marriage market and parental cooperation in providing 
housing space are  factors fostering premarital cohabitation, but i t  is not clear to me how 
cohabiters avoid getting into trouble with the grass roots moral "enforcers" who are  so ubiquitous 
27. 1 considered one other possible explanation. In rural areas there has been a substantial reduction in secondary school 
enrollments in the reform era, a reduction that perhaps affects the educntional nttninn~ent of rural wonlen most of all. Other 
things being equal, reduced years of schooling should promote earlier marriage. However, I discovered that women in the sample 
who married in the lnid-1980s tended to have had slightly more years of schooling than women who married at  the end of the Mao 
era. (Interestingly. this exanlinntion also revealed that even in recent years women have not regained the high educational 
attainment levels they had achieved just prior to the onset of the Cultural Revolution. when a t  marriage the average woman had 
an upper middle school education or slightly more.) 
28. The cohabitation question was a direct one, unlike the questions on pren~nritnl sex and pregnancy, and one that I had thought 
was eliminated as unsuitable to Chinese conditions and was surprised to see included in the final questionnaire. It might be 
noted that the Detroit figure on cohabitntion conceals a striking recent increase, with of the women who married within the 
finnl five years covered by the survey saying they had lived together prior to marriage. 
in Chinese neighborhoods and work units. Press critiques of this emergent trend place the blame 
squarely on the influence of "decadent" Western ideas, but it is not clear that  we should take this 
explanation s e r i o u ~ l y . ~ ~  In any case, there appears to be the modest beginnings of a trend toward 
premarital cohabitation in the reform era, even if the sources of this trend remain somewhat 
obscure. To summarize, while in general the figures in Table 2 show a highly varied set of change 
patterns, only in a few instances is there any indication of the reform era  producing new trends. 
Table 3 about here 
Finally, in Table 3 I present a variety of measures dealing with how the wedding was 
celebrated. For the most part  these figures are strikingly different from those in the previous two 
tables, and we see here dramatic evidence of new trends in the reform era. The primary pattern 
in this table is not entirely a surprise, since the Chinese press has been filled with criticism of 
"excessive" wedding celebrations. In general, marriages have been celebrated more elaborately 
and expensively in the post-Mao e ra  than in earlier periods. In the reform era marriage cohort 
(column 5) we can see that  wedding celebrations and wedding banquets were more often held than 
for previous cohorts, that  banquets more often took place in restaurants (the primary subcategory 
within "other" in #5), that  gifts of various kinds increased in frequency and expense, and that  the 
total expenditure on weddings also rose.30 Several features of this main trend should be noted, 
however. First, i t  woulc! appear that  the era of the most frugal and ritually simple weddings was 
not, in fact, the Cultural Revolution, but the years from 1958 to 1965.31 
29. For discussions on this topic, see Li Xionfu. "Weihuii tongjuzhe yongtandiao," (The aria of cohobiters), Wenhui yuekon, no. 12, 
1987. pp. 2-9; Honig and Hershntter, op. cit.. pp. 114-16. 
30. The compnrison with the Detroit figures on weddings and receptions is not too illuminating. but  it does point to one contrast. In 
Chinese urban weddings the celebration itself is often followed by o meal for a smaller group of family n ~ e n ~ b e r s  and close friends. 
while in American marriages the attendance a t  the reception often exceeds that  a t  the  wedding. The attendance nnd expenditure 
overages given in Tnble 3 (in #2.4.10.12. and 14) are averages for only those who reported having the activity or exchange in 
question. If I con~puted overages for all women in the sample the resulting means would. of course, be lower. Because of the 
s111nl1 number of cases for which bride prices figures were given, the trends in expenditures on this item (see #12) are not very 
relioble, especially for the pre-1957 period. 
31. Another curious finding, not shown in Table 3. is that a n  ofticinlly preferred form of "socialist" weddings designed to inhibit 
excessive expenditures, has never been widely followed and is even less so in recent times. This is the "collective wedding." in 
which large nuli~bers of couples are n~orried together in a joint ceremony. The proportion of weddings that  took this form in the 
four PRC iiiarringe cohorts were %. 5%- 0%. and 2%. In this case the apparently most doctrinaire socinlist era. the Cultural 
Revolution. wns lenst likely to follow the  preferred form of wedding, perhnps because of the orgnnizotionnl chaos of tha t  period. 
Figure 3 about  here 
I wondered, though, whether economic privation or political radicalism contributed more to 
wedding simplification, since both were present in abundance in the 1958-65 period. To answer 
this question I performed another more fine-grained analysis. I constructed a seven item mean 
scale of wedding elaborateness and expenditures from items #1,2,3,4,13,14, and 15.32 The three 
year moving average of this wedding elaborateness scale is graphed across various years of 
marriage in Figure 3. Again, there are several different things that  can be learned from such a 
graph. The overall pattern is one already familiar from Table 3--a decline in wedding 
elaborateness and expenditures and then a subsequent revival to if anything higher levels than a t  
any point earlier, producing the rough U curve visible in Figure 3. In this case, a s  earlier, 
changes were underway even prior to 1949. During the depression and the early years of World 
War I1 wedding expenditures declined, with a partial revival that  peaked in 1946, during the brief 
interlude between anti-Japanese and civil wars. Then the simplification trend resumed and 
continued after 1949. In general weddings were held to a fairly constant and spartan level 
throughout the period from 1953 to 1970. Within this period the most spartan levels reached, 
during the post-Great Leap famine and the early, radical years of the Cultural Revolution, seem 
quite similar. What explains the differences between the two eras tha t  I found in Table 3 is that  
the recovery and increasing elaborateness of weddings after 1970 was sharper and more 
sustained than the earlier partial recovery in the years 1963-5. 
This comparison does not settle the issue of the relative contributions of economic and 
political influences, but i t  does reveal clearly that  the trend toward increasing expenditures on 
weddings preceded the death of Mao, even if it has continued and even accelerated in the reform 
era. So this latest trend cannot be explained simply in terms of new policies and influences of the 
reform era. Factors such a s  the return to some degree of political and economic normalcy after 
32. The methods used to construct this scnle were the some as those described earlier in regard to the freedom of mote choice scale. 
The overage item-to-itel11 correlation onlong these seven wedding itellls was r=.32. 
the most chaotic years of the Cultural Revolution, a s  well a s  heightened anxiety about attracting a 
desirable mate, produced by the program of sending youth to the countryside and urban 
unemployment, may have contributed to this revival. Families were more willing and able to 
celebrate weddings with some fanfare in the final years of Mao's life, even before the reformers 
mounted the stage and made conspicuous consumption fashionable. 
Returning to my examination of Table 3, it is also interesting to note that  of the various 
kinds of gift presentations that  may occur in a wedding, the dowry appears to be most common 
and most expensive. This finding is somewhat of a surprise, since press critiques of wedding 
expenses mostly focus on exhorbitant demands made for gifts from the husband-to-be and his 
family to the b r i d e - t ~ - b e . ~ ~  Our figures show that, although there are modest increases in the 
frequency and cost of such male gifts (see #9 and #lo),  these are dwarfed by the reported dowry 
transactions (see #13 and #14). One might speculate that  in the current highly competitive urban 
marriage market, with particular anxiety expressed about the problem of "overage maidens" 
(daling guniang), family provision of a substantial dowry becomes a n  important method to attract 
a suitable groom, and high demands for gifts for the bride become a risky strategy. I also note 
that  the figures in the table provide evidence for the point made earlier in Urban Life in 
Contemporary China: that in contemporary large cities, unlike in rural areas, "true" bride price 
payments from the groom's family to the bride's family are  not generally involved. 
Is the increased elaborateness of weddings expressed in traditional forms or in a Western 
mode? In most respects the figures in Table 3 point to some Westernization of weddings, rather 
than a revival of traditional customs. We do not see, for example, any taking of sedan chairs out 
of mothballs, while the use of bicycles and even automobiles to deliver the bride to the celebration 
is becoming more common (see #6). In addition, wedding feasts in restaurants and honeymoon 
trips after the celebration are becoming increasingly common, just as happened earlier in places 
33. In popular discussions of this topic one also hears the denlands for gifts from the male to the bride stressed, nnd there ore a 
variety of set phrases-"three rounds and one sound." "thirty legs." and so forth-which are used to denote the consumer durables 
and furniture that are expected. See also the discussion in Hong and Hershotter. op. cit.. Chapter 4. 
like Hong Kong and Taipei. And most of the gifts exchanged are modern consumer durables and 
furniture, rather than items that  would have gone into a traditional set  of wedding gifts.34 And 
from anecdotal information not dealt with in our questionnaire we know of even more clear 
instances of Western influence on wedding customs. For example, in recent years it has become 
more and more common for urban couples to go to a photographer to have a formal wedding 
portrait taken, and for this portrait the bride wears a rented Western-style white wedding gown. 
Even though the gown is generally only worn in the photographer's studio, and not in the wedding 
celebrations themselves, still it will be this photo that  will be hung on a wall in memory of the 
occasion. 
Although much of the evidence from the Chengdu survey seems to point to Western or 
"modern" influences predominating in reform era weddings, still there are important exceptions. 
In particular, I note in #8 that  it has become - less common in recent times, rather than more, for 
the bride and groom to s tar t  out married life in their own apartment. Neolocal residence was 
most common in the period from 1958 to 1965, and since then starting out "in their own place" 
has  decreased markedly, with both residence with the bride's parents and residence with the 
groom's becoming increasingly common (with the latter still more than twice as  likely as the 
former). The most obvious explanation for this reversal of trends is the severe housing shortage 
in urban China generally, which even the extensive residential construction of the post-Mao era 
has  not fully relieved. But whatever the cause, these results show that  even though young people 
now pick their spouses in a non-traditional way, an increasing share of them have to s tar t  out 
married life living in a traditional family structure.S5 And this trend is occurring despite signs in 
recent public opinion polls that  there is increasing preference, by young people and even some old 
people, for nuclear family living. The familial interdependence expressed in these housing 
arrangements is also revealed in data about the pattern of payment for weddings (not displayed in 
34. Our questionnaire asked about what items were included in the various kinds of wedding gifts. as  well as about their value, 
although the infornlation on specific items is not given here. 
35. Of course, it could be noted that the 12% in the inost recent cohort who nlorried n~atrilocally are not being very traditional, since 
they are not moving in with the groom's parents. Still, they are establishing an extended family. rather than the sort of nuclear 
family that is the do~ninant fornl in competitive and individualistic modern societies. 
Table 3). As the expenditure on weddings has increased, the proportion of brides and grooms who 
pay for everything themselves has dropped from a high of 79% for Great Leap era marriages to 
only 28% among reform era  couples. Increasingly, the resources of a diverse family network must 
be pooled to meet the expenditure required, and even grandparents and others are likely to chip 
in.36 So although I again stress that  this interdependence upon an extended family does not 
indicate a return to a pattern of arranged'marriages, still in certain respects the reform era trends 
in family life seem quite contrary to the move toward a more competitive and even individualistic 
society that  China's reformers seem to be trying to foster. 
What do the patterns in Table 3 tell us about the change mechanisms that  are affecting 
wedding celebrations? In  this instance we can see signs of all three mechanisms operating, and i t  
is difficult to weigh their relative importance. It seems obvious that  the relaxation of official 
pressure that  fostered frugal weddings earlier has been important in permitting increasingly 
elaborate and public wedding celebrations to be held. One might even speculate that, despite 
official criticism of excessive expenditures on weddings, the authorities are not really too 
displeased, since the need to prepare for such costly affairs provides a n  important motivation for 
working harder, a motivation that  was not required for a simple "tea and candy" wedding in the 
late Mao era. Envy of the incomes and consumption levels of others is, after all, seen by the 
reformers as  a powerful incentive mechanism. In any case, official policy shifts that are the 
central dynamic of the directed change mechanism seem to have played an  important role in the 
increasing scale of post-Mao urban marriages. 
Structural changes appear to be at work as  well. You have in the post-Mao era rising 
income levels and the kinds of increasing consumption aspirations that  help to fuel competitive 
spending on weddings in more modern societies,37 but in addition you have a structural constraint 
36. 1 hove not included figures in Table 3 on the gifts-usunlly in cash-that couples received fro111 guests a t  their weddings, but these 
hnve also increased nnd help to meet the costs of an eloborate wedding. To he specific. 100% of the Greot Leap era weddings 
involved receipt of less thnn 400Y from guests. but this was the case for only 45% of reform era weddings. 
37. It might be noted that in the Detroit survey results I found evidence of incrensing scnle ond ritual elnborateness of weddings in 
recent yenrs, in spite of such trends as rising premnritnl cohabitntion. I assume that the main bnsis for this trend in the Detroit 
salnple is the rise in living standards and the return to "normnlcy" that followed the depression and World War 11. 
provided by a cramped housing supply, which helps to sustain extended family cooperation in 
meeting the demands of getting married.  ina all^, I have also noted a variety of ritual signs that  
Western influence is increasingly affecting how Chengdu residents marry. In general, then, all 
three mechanisms seem to be working together to help produce the dramatic changes in wedding 
celebrations in the reform era. 
Conclusions 
In this preliminary examination of the marriage experiences of urban women in Chengdu I 
have uncovered a number of complexities, rather than one simple pattern. If I focus only on the 
question of the social consequences of the post-Mao reforms, then my primary conclusion is that  
most aspects of marriage customs have not changed tha t  much in the reform era.38 In many 
areas, particularly those related to freedom of mate choice, the reform era displays basic 
continuity with earlier periods, and some of the changes visible in the reform era, such a s  the 
increase in brides who married from intact families and a rising proportion of brides already in the 
work force, also are  simple extensions of earlier patterns. Only in the realm of wedding 
celebrations do I see clear evidence that  things have changed dramatically, and even in this realm 
changes were already underway in the late-Mao era. The reform era has made it possible and 
perhaps even necessary to engage in an  elaborate and expensive set of wedding customs, and 
some contemporary weddings take a partially Westernized form that  would have been criticized in 
earlier eras. But other aspects of the process of getting married have not changed nearly a s  
much, and in some realms, such a s  the pattern of residence after marriage, there are even signs 
of reversion to more traditional Chinese patterns. Although to some extent I have utilized all 
three change mechanisms in explaining the specifics of the Chengdu findings, still on balance I 
would argue that  the social structural change mechanism emerges as most important overall. In 
urban Chengdu the reforms have produced rising incomes, approval of competitive consumption, 
38. One aspect of mate choice on which we have datn in our Chengdu survey hns not been dealt with here-the pattern of assortative 
mnting, or of who n~arries wholti. The complexities of exanlining stntus matching a t  marriage in ternis of family bockground, 
education, party membership. and other factors, and how the degree of that matching may have changed over time will be denlt 
with in a subsequent work. 
and access to Western symbols to use in this competition, but the underlying structure of 
opportunities and controls within which urbanites operate has not changed all that  much. Only if 
more substantial changes in this urban organizational structure occur can we expect to see sharp 
changes in other aspects of marriage customs such as we have seen in wedding  celebration^.^^ 
These observations lead to some final ruminations about the impact of socialist structural 
changes on family life. Earlier I noted that modernization/convergence theorists such as William 
Goode argue that  the direction of family change in societies such as China is predictable--it is 
toward patterns that  are increasingly similar to the "conjugal" family life that is found in 
contemporary Western societies. However, I also suggested that  socialist transformation could 
hasten this process by accelerating the shift away from familial control over resources and 
opportunities. After reflecting on the figures presented in this paper, and particularly on those 
relating to freedom of mate choice, I feel I must qualify that  argument. I t  would appear that  in 
certain respects socialism does hasten the early stages of the family change process, but then the 
new institutional structures take hold and keep the process from going much further. In other 
words, the consolidated state socialist system may lead to "stalled convergence" in areas such a s  
freedom of mate choice. 
Major changes in the structure of that system could, a s  I have just noted, lead to a new 
acceleration in the family change process. However, the urban reforms to date do not entail such 
major structural changes, but instead are producing a more incremental modernization process 
that  is comparable in some ways to what has occurred in capitalist societies. If this observation is 
correct, i t  means that  the reforms could foster shifts toward the emergence of a true dating 
culture, increased levels of premarital sexual activity, and so forth. But such changes would only 
emerge gradually, as educational levels increased; jobs, housing, and other resources became 
increasingly available through market channels; and other forms of modernization gradually 
39. For example. I would expect that if in the future market reforms progress much further than they hove to date in urban China, 
reducing the dependence of young people upon both fanlilies and various bureaucratic gatekeepers. then more of a dating culture 
should develop, acco~t~panied by increases in such things as having had more than one marital prospect, having experienced 
premarital sex, and living neolocally after marriage. 
evolved. This means that  I should not be surprised that  I can only see faint glimmerings of such 
changes in the Chengdu data. It is simply too early. After becoming accustomed to the sharp 
social changes which seemed to follow in the wake of Party pronouncements and campaigns in the 
Mao era, China analysts may have to get used to the idea that Chinese family life will evolve in 
slower and less dramatic ways. 
Table 1:Changes in Aspects of Freedom of Mate Choice in Chengdu 
Year First Married 
1933-48 49-57 58-65 66-76 77-87Detroit 
7 1 107 8 2 116 210 459 
1.Trad. Arranged Marriage(%) 6 9 2 2 1 0 0 n.a. 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
2.Type of Marriage: 
a. Arranged(%) 6 8 27 0 1 2 n.a. 
b.1ntermediat.e 15 3 3  4 5 40 41 n.a. 
c.Individual choice 17 4 0 55 59 57 n.a. 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
3.Dominant Role in Mate Choice: 
a.Parents(%) 5 6 30  7 8 5 n.a. 
b.Mixed 15 11 6 3 6 n.a. 
c.Respondent 2 8 5 9  87 89  89 n.a. 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
4.Introduced to Husband(%) 9 1 76 54 59 60 44 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
5.Who Provided the Introduction? 
a.Own generation(%) 38 4 3 75 75 74 84  
b.Other 8 17  7 6 9 9 
c.ParentsY generation 53 4 0 18 1 9  17 7 
6.Dated Husband Prior to Marriage? 
a.Often(%) 12 17  24 40 48 n.a. 
b.Sometimes 6 18 2 7 1 3  21 n.a. 
c . b r e l y  23 22 30 3 1 24 n.a. 
d.Never 5 9 4 4 18 16 7 n.a. 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
7.Number of Romances: 
a.None(%) 73 29 9 5 5 0 
b.One 2 4 6 3  7 4 66 67 34 
c.More than one 3 8 18 2 9 28 66 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
8.Had Other Marital Prospects(%) 4 5 2 6 9 45 
%How Much in Love When Married? 47 
a.Completely(%) 17 3 8  6 3 6 1 67 22 
b. 2 6 29 22 26 19 14 
c. 3 5 20 9 11 10 8 
d. 9 4 4 1 3 4 
e.Not a t  all 13 9 2 1 0 2 
4 




n a .  =not available 
Table 2:Changes in t h e  Circumstances  of Marr iages  in Chengdu 
Year First Married 
1933-48 49-57 58-65 66-76 77-87Detroit 
N - 7 1 107 8 2 116 210 459 
1.Respondent Premarital Work:(%) 
18 2 7 8 3 8 6 98 69 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
2.Premarital Work Plans: 
a.Be a housewife(%) 36 9 1 2 5 49 
b.Work some of the time 
8 9 3 2 2 34 
c.Have a lifelong career 
56 8 1 9 6 9 6 94 17 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
3.Parents Together When Wed:(%) 
56 5 7 5 1 65 79 69 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
4.Mother Approval of Mate Chosen: 
a.Strongly approve(%) 3 5 18 23 15 22 28 
b. Approve 5 3 7 2 56 65 66 48 
c.Neutra1 0 3 8 3 1 1 
d.Disapprove 11 6 13 14 11 17 
e.Strongly disapprove 2 1 0 3 1 6 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
5.Father Approval of Mate Chosen: 
a.Strongly approve(%) 2 6 1 3  26 16 20 26 
b.Approve 60 77 6 3 6 3 68 50 
c.Neutra1 2 3 9 5 2 3 
d.Disapprove 9 6 3 1 3  9 12 
e.Strongly disapprove 2 0 0 3 1 8 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
6.Husband Married Before:(%) 15 1 5  5 6 3 12 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
7.First Sex Before Married:(%) 4 1 5  15 19 18 57 
a.Premarita1 sex(max%): 
12 2 1 24 25 30 62 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
&Timing of First Birth: 
a.Before marriage(%) 2 3 3 3 1 6 
b.Within 8 months 7 4 5 4 9 15 
c.Later 9 2 9 3 9 3 9 3 90 79 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
10.Knew Husband Before Marriage:(yrs) 
1.2 1.2 2.4 2.2 2.4 2.4 
11.Respondent Age at First Marriage:(yrs) 
18.1 19.9 22.5 23.7 25.1 21.2 
12.Age of First Husband at Marriage:(yrs) 
25.3 25.9 26.5 27.1 27.7 24.5 
Table 3:Changes in Wedding Behavior in Chengdu 
Year First Married 
1933-48 49-57 58-65 66-76 77-87Detroit 
7 1 107 82 116 210 459 
1.Wedding Ceremony Held:(%) 85 74 6 6 74 89 100 
2.Attendance at Wedding:(mean n) 
6 0 5 5 6 6 6 6 102 91 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
3.Wedding Banquet Held:(%) 75 4 6 20 28 68 80 
4.Banquet Attendance:(mean n) 60 4 9 4 9 5 1 85 120 
5.Where Was Banquet Held? 
a.At home(%) 7 2 78 69 7 6 33 n.a. 
b.Other 2 8 22 3 1 24 67 n.a. 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
~ . H O W  Respondent Was Delivered to Wedding: 
a.Sedan chair(%) 55 22 0 0 0 n.a. 
b.Bicycle 1 1 1 11 20 n.a. 
c.Automobile 8 0 0 1 9 n.a. 
d.On foot 24 50  67 7 1 50 n.a. 
e.Other 11 2 7 32 17 21 n.a. 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
7.Honeymoon Trip Taken:(%) 1 3 2 14 2 1 5 4 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
8.Postmarital Residence: 
a.With bride's family(%) 
10 7 4 7 12 9 
b.With groom's family 4 5 2 5  13 16 2 8 LO 
c.In own place 3 9 6 4 7 1 6 8 5 1 70 
d.Other 6 4 12 9 9 11 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
9.Gifts from Husband to Bride?(%) 
3 4 18 2 1 22 31 n.a. 
10.Value of Mean Gifts to Bride:(Y) 
198.6 204.9 52.4 105.8 200.2 n.a. 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
1 1.Bride Price Given:(%) 18 9 5 6 9 n.a. 
12.Value of Mean Bride Price:(Y) 35.9 158.9 23.3 49.7 61.9 n.a. 
13.Dowry Given to Bride:(%) 5 6 36 2 6 32 71 n.a. 
14.Value of Mean Dowry:(Y) 228.7 167.3 139.2 128.1 343.4 n.a. 
.......................................................................................................................................... 
15.Total Spent on the Wedding: 
a.Under 500 yuan(%) 8 2 8 9  94 8 0 15 n.a. 
b.500-999yuan 10 8 6 13 32 n.a. 
c. 1000 +yuan 7 3 0 7 53 n.a. 
n.a. =not available 
Free Choice 
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